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The macroeconomics of the 
Latin American economic boom
José Antonio Ocampo
This paper argues that the recent boom in the Latin American 
economies can be explained by the conjunction of two external factors 
not found together since the 1970s: strong commodity prices (more so 
for hydrocarbons and mining products than for agricultural commodities) 
and exceptional external financing conditions. Concerning the latter, the 
key development was the massive influx of capital during two periods of 
“exuberance” in international financial markets (between mid-2004 and April 
2006, and between mid-2006 and mid-2007), particularly the second. It also 
argues for the importance of spreading and consolidating Latin America’s 
two great (and complementary) macroeconomic policy innovations of 
recent years: countercyclical fiscal management (still confined to just a few 
countries) and active intervention in currency markets. Such intervention 
needs to be based on a growing recognition that the real exchange rate 
ought to be an explicit goal of macroeconomic policy.
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In 2007, Latin America will have had four consecutive 
years of rapid growth (ECLAC, 2007a). There has not 
been a period of such strong economic expansion in the 
region since the long post-war boom that culminated in 
the debt crisis (or a few years earlier in some countries). 
This situation has come, furthermore, after almost a quarter 
of a century of unsatisfactory performance marked by 
the “lost decade” of the 1980s, the “lost half-decade” of 
1998-2002 and a period of weak performance between the 
two. What is more, the current situation is characterized 
by a combination of rapid growth and a large current 
account surplus that is exceptional in Latin America’s 
economic history, as well as by improved labour market, 
poverty and income distribution. The countries have also 
adopted a more explicit policy of intervening in currency 
markets and increasing their external assets, while the 
tendency to follow procyclical macroeconomic policies 
has been corrected to some extent. So far, however, 
progress with the latter has been largely confined to 
just a few countries.
This paper analyses the current macroeconomic 
situation and seeks to identify its particular charac-
teristics. After examining the main macroeconomic 
results and their relationship with world economic 
conditions (section II), it looks more closely at the 
effects of movements in international financial mar-
kets (section III), analyses macroeconomic policy 
developments in the region’s seven largest economies 
(section IV) and ends with some brief conclusions 
(section V).
II
The current situation and the international context
In the past few years, Latin America has at last retur-
ned to the economic growth rates of the 1970s. Given 
that the two largest Latin American economies (Brazil 
and Mexico) have performed less well now than they 
did then, the indicators look even better when simple 
averages of GDP growth in the region’s countries are 
compared. If that is done, the situation now is an im-
provement on the 1970s. Furthermore, since the rate of 
population increase has fallen sharply, the results look 
even more impressive when calculated in terms of per 
capita output growth.
The explanation for this is basically to be sought in 
the exceptional conditions prevailing in the international 
economy over the last few years.1 Although, as we shall 
see later, some aspects of macroeconomic management 
have been more effective than in the past, this is not 
necessarily something that contributes to short-term 
growth. Indeed, it is possible that the countercyclical 
macroeconomic policies the Latin American countries 
have begun adopting, albeit very unevenly, might actually 
be sacrificing current demand growth to an improved 
ability to deal with adverse economic conditions in 
future. Nor can the improvement in performance be 
attributed to economic reforms, whose effects on the 
production structure and economic growth have been 
much debated and may actually have been more nega-
tive than positive.2 From a Schumpeterian perspective 
of “creative destruction”, however, it might perhaps 
1 See the recent essay by Izquierdo, Romero and Talvi (2007).
2 For an ambivalent assessment from a perspective that is generally 
favourable to the reforms, see Kuczynski and Williamson (2003). A 
more critical evaluation can be found in Ocampo (2004).
 A version of this paper was presented at the fourth economic forum 
of the Getulio Vargas Foundation on 17 September 2007. The author is 
grateful to Rudy Loo-Kung, Julio Marichal, Mariangela Parra, Helvia 
Velloso and Jürgen Weller for providing the necessary statistical 
information. Discussions with Guillermo Calvo and Osvaldo Kacef 
helped to clarify some of the ideas dealt with here.
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be said that the reform-led phase of destruction in the 
countries’ production capacity is now over, and that 
what should prevail from now on are rather the factors 
favouring the creation of new export capabilities. The 
absence or weakness of productive development poli-
cies, however, is still one of the main shortcomings of 
economic policy in the region.
The current boom is basically due, then, to the 
conjunction of two favourable factors of external origin 
not seen together since the 1970s: strong commodity 
prices and exceptional external financing conditions. 
The economic history of Latin America shows that this 
combination leads infallibly to rapid economic growth. 
In the current circumstances, however, the transmission 
mechanisms for external financing have been somewhat 
different, mainly because governments have been far 
more circumspect in their use of such financing.
To these two favourable factors must be added a 
third: large remittances by Latin American migrants to 
their home countries. This factor has had a large effect 
on the economies that are closest geographically to 
the United States and, interestingly enough, has been 
particularly important in most of the small economies 
whose terms of trade have deteriorated in recent years 
because of high oil prices. Meanwhile, the boom in in-
ternational trade has boosted growth in the manufactured 
goods and services exports on which the region (and 
especially the economies of Mexico, Central America 
and the Caribbean) increasingly depends.
It should be added that the external situation is 
also exceptional in another way: this is the first period 
in global economic history when per capita GDP has 
grown much faster in the developing countries than in 
the industrialized world, i.e., the first reversal of the 
tendency in global economic history for development 
levels in the two sets of countries to diverge (United 
Nations, 2006). However, it is still too soon to speak of 
true long-term convergence in these levels, except in the 
case of some Asian economies. Moreover, the current 
boom has encompassed every region of the developing 
world and, among them, Latin America has been in fact 
the weakest performer (United Nations, 2007).
The factors giving rise to this exceptional perfor-
mance are well known. High raw material prices are 
mainly due to the heavy dependence of the Chinese 
economy on commodity imports. Exceptional finan-
cing conditions, in turn, reflect a wide array of factors: 
(i) the tolerance of the monetary authorities in the world’s 
leading economies for low interest rates, owing to low 
inflation levels; (ii) major financial innovations that, 
combined with the search for higher returns, multiplied 
the demand for and liquidity of riskier financial instru-
ments; (iii) the consequent large reduction in the risk 
premiums of such securities, and (iv) the large build-up 
of developing countries’ international reserves, owing 
to the saving of exceptional foreign exchange surpluses 
and the demand for “self-insurance” that arose after 
the Asian crisis, when it became clear that there was 
no international mechanism for dealing with crises 
caused by sudden stops in external financing. Some of 
these conditions, particularly the second, are changing. 
Rising remittances, meanwhile, reflect growing move-
ments of labour (both regular and irregular) from Latin 
America to the industrialized countries, partly because 
of very limited job creation in the region during the 
“lost half-decade”.
Figure 1 shows the long-term rise in commodity 
prices, taking the 1945-1980 period as the base. As it 
illustrates, this has been much less exceptional than is 
usually thought. Indeed, the drop in real prices for non-
oil commodities in the 1980s and 1990s has yet to be 
reversed. In addition, the process has been very uneven, 
benefiting mining products more than agricultural ones. 
In real terms (deflated by a manufacturing price index), 
metal prices in 2006 stood 76% above the 1945-1980 
average, an extraordinary level surpassed only in a few 
years in the early twentieth century. Conversely, prices 
for tropical and temperate zone agricultural products 
in 2006 were still 41% and 29%, respectively, below 
their 1945-1980 levels; some of these prices have risen 
in 2007, however, because of the biofuels boom. Price 
rises for oil and gas have come on top of those for mining 
products, although the oil price only very recently rose 
back to its 1970s level in real terms. Thus, the recent 
commodity price boom involves hydrocarbons and 
mining products more than agricultural commodities. 
It is still too soon to speak of long-term improvements 
in real prices reversing the downward trend in non-oil 
commodity prices seen over the twentieth century 
(Ocampo and Parra, 2003).
Among the factors helping Latin America’s current 
account balance over recent years, the dominant one has 
been the improvement in its terms of trade, amounting to 
the equivalent of 3.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) 
for the region as a whole between 2003 and 2006 (table 1). 
Some of these gains were automatically taken out in 
the form of profit remittances by foreign firms active 
in mining sectors. However, while this effect has been 
large in some countries, for the region as a whole the 
factor income balance trend has improved marginally as 
net production factor payments and the cost of foreign 
debt have fallen relative to GDP. Meanwhile, migrants’ 
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remittances, which improved the balance of payments by 
0.9% of GDP between 2000 and 2003, have not made a 
major additional contribution in recent years, although 
they are still a major source of income for some of the 
region’s smaller economies.
The fact is that, in net terms, the greatest contributor 
to the balance of payments after the improvement in the 
terms of trade has been increased net financial flows, 
a reflection once again of their markedly procyclical 
character. This tendency also contrasts with that of net 
foreign direct investment, reflecting the twofold effect 
of lower investment in Latin America and the expansion 
of Latin American firms abroad.
The relative importance of financial flows and 
improved terms of trade is better observed if the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is excluded from 
the calculations, as the country has experienced the 
greatest terms-of-trade gains while its capital account is 
dominated by official capital flows. As table 1 shows, 
when the Venezuelan economy is excluded from the 
calculations, the improvement in the terms of trade 
between 2003 and 2006 falls to 2.5 points of GDP 
while the increase in financial flows rises to 1.7 points. 
Furthermore, the importance of external financing was 
particularly marked during the phases of “exuberance” 
in international financial markets, as will be seen in 
section III of this paper.
The most striking new feature of the current situa-
tion is the region’s ability to grow quickly while at the 
same time generating a current account surplus, and thus 
a net transfer of resources abroad. This combination, 
characteristic of the dynamic economies of East Asia, 
is unprecedented in the region’s history. As figure 2 
shows, the closest parallel is with the situation of the 
1950s and 1960s, when Latin America combined growth 
with small current account surpluses (or small deficits, 
if the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is excluded). 
In the 1970s, the region kept on growing rapidly but 
became dependent on net transfers of resources from 
abroad, and the same happened when economic growth 
resumed, but more slowly, in 1990-1997. As is well 
known, the great volatility of financial flows meant that 
depending on external resources for growth ultimately 
proved counterproductive on both occasions.
Does this mean we are on the verge of a shift towards 
long-term economic growth with current account sur-
pluses, as in many of the most successful economies of 
East Asia? The answer, sadly, is no. The most important 
achievement in the current situation has been the im-
provement in the region’s external borrowing position 
(figure 3, panel A). Combined with the debt reduction 
processes of recent years, this means that the pressure 
of large external debts will be felt less in future or, to be 
accurate, will be felt in a smaller group of countries.
FIGuRE 1













1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2004 2005 2006
Non-oil commodities Tropical agriculture Other agriculture Metals
Source: Original data from Ocampo and Parra (2003), updated with individual product information from the united Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (uNCTAD).
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TABLE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: factors underlying the improvement  
in the balance of payments
(Percentages of gross domestic product in current dollars)









A. All Latin America and Caribbean
 
Current account balance –4.4 –3.0 –2.4 –2.8 –1.0 0.4 1.0 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.8 1.2
   Terms of trade effect –1.3 –1.0 0.0 –0.7 –0.7 –0.3 0.8 1.8 3.0 1.3 –0.3 3.4
   Discounting terms of trade effect –3.0 –2.1 –2.4 –2.1 –0.2 0.7 0.2 –0.4 –1.4 0.6 3.1 –2.2
Foreign direct investment 3.0 4.4 3.6 3.4 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.1 1.1 0.5 –1.5 –1.0
Financial capital 0.4 –2.1 –0.4 –1.5 –3.2 –1.9 –2.6 –1.2 –0.6 –0.8 –1.5 1.3
Overall balance –0.9 –0.7 0.8 –0.8 –1.5 0.6 0.7 2.3 2.1 1.7 –0.2 1.5
Memo: Transfers 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.1 0.2 0.9 0.0
B. Excluding Venezuela (B.R.)
Current account balance –4.4 –3.3 –3.2 –3.1 –1.5 –0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.2 2.9 0.9
   Terms of trade effect –0.5 –0.4 0.0 –0.4 –0.5 –0.3 0.6 1.1 2.2 0.5 –0.3 2.5
   Discounting terms of trade effect –3.8 –2.9 –3.2 –2.6 –0.9 0.1 –0.3 –0.7 –1.4 0.6 3.2 –1.5
Foreign direct investment 3.0 4.6 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.1 2.4 2.1 1.2 0.6 –1.4 –0.9
Financial capital 0.6 –2.0 0.1 –1.2 –2.7 –1.6 –2.1 –0.3 0.1 –0.5 –1.7 1.7
Overall balance  –0.8 –0.8 0.5 –0.7 –1.3 0.3 0.6 2.3 2.1 1.3 –0.2 1.8
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECLAC statistics.
FIGuRE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean: Relationship between the goods  
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Latin America and Caribbean Excl. Venezuela (B.R.)
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECLAC statistics.
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FIGuRE 3
Latin America: External debt and the current account
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Current account balance Adjusted for terms of trade
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ECLAC (2007a).
Conversely, the current account surplus has two 
important characteristics that undermine its positive 
effect. First, it is largely confined to just seven coun-
tries, five of them oil or mineral producers (Bolivia, 
Chile, Ecuador, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela) and two with more diversified export 
structures (Argentina and Brazil). Of the latter, Brazil’s 
current account could move into deficit in the near 
future. Second, when adjusted for the improvement 
in the terms of trade, the current account has been in 
deficit since 2005 and is deteriorating rapidly, which 
means that deficits in 2007 will be very similar to those 
of 2000-2001 (figure 3, panel B). The conjunction of 
these two factors indicates that the current account 
surplus is heavily dependent on the boom in interna-
tional hydrocarbon and mineral prices. Therefore, the 
improvement in the current account should be viewed 
with the caution recommended by Calvo and Talvi 
(2007) rather than with the optimism that is common 
among other observers. Indeed, the calculations of 
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those authors are much more unfavourable than those 
shown in figure 3, panel B.3
The above analysis indicates, then, that the situation 
of rapid growth with large current account surpluses is 
unlikely to continue in future and that the region’s balance 
of payments depends heavily on exceptional international 
prices for hydrocarbons and minerals. Although it is not 
impossible that this situation may persist if the Chinese 
economy continues its rapid expansion, the lesson from the 
region’s economic history is that it is perilous to assume 
that high commodity prices will be permanent. Again, 
the severe turmoil in international financial markets in 
the third quarter of 2007 reminds us that this other source 
of the current boom – exceptional external financing 
conditions – may also weaken as time goes on. This is 
compounded, of course, by the uncertainty surrounding 
economic growth around the world, and especially in the 
United States, as a result of these events.
III
The effects of international  
financial movement
Although commodity prices have recently played a 
decisive role in the macroeconomic dynamics of Latin 
America, the international financial markets have also 
had a major influence. The nature of financial flows has 
changed and so, consequently, have the transmission 
mechanisms. Indeed, every boom has its own specific 
features: in the 1970s, inflows derived essentially from 
lending by groups of banks (“syndicated loans”), but 
in the 1990s they came mainly from international bond 
issues.
The nature of recent financial flows can be better 
appreciated from the external balance sheets shown in 
table 2. This table, which covers the seven largest Latin 
American economies, reveals two striking changes. The 
first is the increase in assets, particularly international 
reserves but also direct and portfolio investments abroad, 
which in all cases grew by even more than these seven 
economies’ GDP in current dollars (which itself rose by 
65% between 2003 and 2006). The second is the large 
shift in the composition of liabilities, essentially driven 
by the reduction in borrowing and the rise of securities 
portfolio liabilities. The latter include investments in 
both the share and bond markets of the region’s countries 
by international investment funds. The counterpart to 
this shift in assets and liabilities, therefore, has been 
the boom in both domestic bond markets (table 2) and 
stock markets.
There are two further features of this balance sheet 
that are worth highlighting. First, net external liabilities 
have fallen sharply: by some 10 percentage points of 
GDP between 2003 and 2006, mostly in the net finan-
cial position. This is true, furthermore, for six of the 
seven largest Latin American economies (the exception 
is Mexico). Three of them (Argentina, Chile and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) now have a positive 
net financial position. Again, the reserves build-up looks 
extremely sound when compared with debt liabilities, 
but much less so if the comparison is with all portfolio 
liabilities. One way of looking at it, and this will become 
much clearer later, is that the build-up of reserves has 
been matched by a rise in portfolio liabilities. Indeed, 
reserves in the region’s two largest countries only cover 
a fairly small proportion of portfolio liabilities, while in 
three countries (especially Mexico, but also Chile and 
Peru, albeit from a much sounder position), reserves 
have increased by less than these liabilities.
Figure 4, panel A, shows how exceptional the recent 
international financial situation has been. Emerging 
market risk spreads began to narrow dramatically in the 
last quarter of 2002; since the second half of 2004 they 
have been systematically lower than they were the year 
before the Asian crisis, and since mid-2005 they have been 
lower than those of high-risk bonds in the united States 
market. Latin America was something of a latecomer to 
this process, but has improved by more than the average 
since 2004. Thus, the second half of 2004 appears to 
mark the beginning of the “exuberance” in international 
financial markets (to use the term coined by the former 3  See also ECLAC (2006, pp. 20-21).
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TABLE 2
Latin America (seven largest economies):a External balance sheet
(Percentages of gross domestic product at current prices)
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Assets  
Totalb 27.6 31.1 33.4 33.1 32.8 34.3
Outward direct investment 6.0 7.3 7.3 7.5 7.3 8.0
Portfolio holdings 2.2 2.5 3.3 3.4 3.6 4.2
Derivatives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Other investments 12.6 13.9 14.0 13.2 11.9 11.5
International reservesb 6.8 7.5 8.7 8.9 9.9 10.6
Liabilities  
Totala 64.9 68.5 73.6 69.6 64.1 63.8
Foreign direct investment 25.5 26.7 29.9 29.4 27.9 27.1
Portfolio holdings 20.6 21.0 24.2 24.0 23.7 25.2
   Stocks 5.7 5.1 7.5 8.8 10.9 13.7
   Debt 14.8 15.9 16.6 15.2 12.8 11.5
Derivatives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Other investmentsb 18.8 20.7 19.5 16.1 12.4 11.3
Assets - liabilities –37.3 –37.4 –40.2 –36.6 –31.4 –29.6
 Direct investment –19.5 –19.4 –22.6 –21.9 –20.6 –19.1
Financial –17.8 –17.9 –17.6 –14.7 –10.8 –10.5
Reserves as % of debt 20.3 20.4 24.0 28.3 39.1 46.5
Reserves as % of portfolio liabilities 33.1 35.5 35.9 37.0 41.6 42.1
Domestic bond market as % of GDP 33.6 32.6 40.3 40.6 46.0 51.8
Financial assets - liabilities  
Argentina –0.3 19.8 20.1 22.0 29.5 26.2
Brazil –34.9 –36.4 –35.2 –31.0 –24.1 –24.3
Chile –3.2 –1.5 3.9 13.5 17.2 27.7
Colombia –15.6 –15.6 –16.8 –11.8 –6.1 –3.7
Mexico –19.3 –18.3 –20.4 –20.4 –21.3 –23.8
Peru –29.4 –27.7 –26.4 –21.3 –14.4 –7.5
Venezuela (B.R.) 23.9 35.9 48.7 44.6 49.5 51.6
Reserves as % of portfolio liabilities  
Argentina 2.2 –14.2 1.7 19.6 67.6 72.8
Brazil 18.1 13.1 13.6 15.7 23.1 28.6
Chile 142.4 145.8 108.3 98.9 93.3 98.3
Colombia 78.8 88.1 84.2 91.8 102.7 96.8
Mexico 30.8 41.6 42.7 39.0 35.8 30.0
Peru 131.1 125.4 105.2 114.4 91.7 98.2
Venezuela (B.R.) 113.5 93.8 111.4 109.4 123.9 161.7
Source: Author’s estimates based on imf International Financial Statistics, GDP in current dollars as per ECLAC data. Bank for International 
Settlements for domestic bond market data.
a Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
b The value of liabilities with the International Monetary Fund (imf) is deducted from these accounts.etario Internacional (fmi).
President of the united States Federal Reserve, Alan 
Greenspan) in relation to developing countries. As table 
3 shows, if that period is taken as the starting point for 
the recent financial boom, the risk spreads of the seven 
largest economies in the region diminished appreciably 
in most cases and only moderately in the two countries 
that were already considered low-risk before the boom 
(Chile and Mexico).
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The fall in spreads has considerably outstripped 
the rise in long-term reference interest rates: those 
of united States Treasury bonds. In fact, long-term 
interest rates on these bonds have increased only very 
moderately since the Federal Reserve began raising its 
rates in September 2004. Thus, the cost of long-term 
external financing has fallen by almost as much as Latin 
American risk spreads. On average, meanwhile, the drop 
in spreads has roughly matched the rise in the shortest-
term united States interest rates, so that in this case the 
net effect has been more varied: while the drop in risk 
spreads has tended to predominate in Brazil, Colombia 
FIGuRE 4
 Latin America: Risk spreads and stock markets





























































































EMBI High-risk bonds EMBI average for 12 months before Asian crisis










































































































Source: JP Morgan Chase for spreads and risk, Morgan Stanley for stock market indices.
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and Peru, low initial spreads in Chile and Mexico mean 
that these countries have faced upward pressure on par 
short-term interest rates (table 3).4
The exuberance in the financial markets was 
transmitted to the Latin American economies through 
three different channels. First, the reduction of country 
risk spreads created direct pressure for lower domestic 
interest rates. A second and sometimes complementa-
ry development was that this pressure fed through to 
exchange rates. Growing foreign investment in local-
currency stock and bond markets thus began to create an 
ever-closer link between domestic and external markets, 
potentially affecting both interest and exchange rates; 
furthermore, these effects could be multiplied by the 
derivatives markets. Third, the strong risk appetite cha-
racterizing this situation was reflected in investments in 
the domestic capital markets of the region’s countries, 
which generated asset inflation in stock markets. As 
figure 4, panel B indicates, the beginning of the great 
Latin American stock market boom coincided with the 
start of the rapid fall in the region’s risk spreads.
The two periods of turmoil in international financial 
markets in recent years also left a clear mark on this 
process. The first, in April and May 2006, originated 
in emerging markets (especially China), while that of 
late July and early August 2007 had its epicentre in the 
united States. The Latin American economies were 
affected by contagion in both cases. This is reflected 
above all in the high correlation between the average risk 
spread of emerging markets and the exchange rates of 
the region’s seven largest economies in the two periods 
of upheaval, with the exception of Peru in both periods 
TABLE 3
Latin America (seven largest economies): Changes in risk spreads and share prices















A. EMBI Globala (change in basis points)
Jul 04-abr 06 –362 –4 680 –375 –2 –278 –66 –219 –417 –147 323 277 57
Apr-jun 06 37 71 37 5 82 19 –3 59 41 22 31 5
Jun-dec 06 –51 –169 –62 1 –78 –39 –84 –43 –39 2 –21 –41
Dec 06-jun 07 16 109 –30 –1 –42 –4 –1 171 1 –21 –9 32
Jun-aug 07 53 125 35 24 78 20 49 125 53 –77 –72 –49
Apr 06-aug 07 55 136 –20 29 40 –4 –39 312 56 –74 –71 –53
Jul 04-aug 07 –307 –4 544 –395 27 –238 –70 –258 –105 –91 249 206 4
B. Share prices (percentage change in dollar terms)
Jul 00-jul 04 5.7 –42.4 –13.4 22.9 188.1 22.1 99.5 7.0  
Jul 04-apr 06 140.9 222.3 176.1 63.8 277.5 113.2 82.3 21.0  
Apr-jun 06 –10.7 –12.9 –11.2 –8.9 –30.2 –9.4 –3.1 –3.3  
Jun-dec 06 26.5 24.7 21.1 27.6 39.1 36.5 23.5 15.9  
Dec 06-jun 07 25.3 3.4 29.6 26.7 9.9 18.5 62.3 2.6  
Jun-aug 07 –5.8 –4.5 –4.9 –6.1 –6.7 –8.2 1.2 –1.8  
Abr 06-aug 07 33.4 7.2 32.5 38.4 –0.6 34.6 96.4 12.8  
<Jul 04-aug 07 221.5 245.6 265.9 126.7 275.4 187.0 257.9 36.5     
Source: JP Morgan Chase for spreads, Morgan Stanley for stock market indices, Federal Reserve data for United States interest rates.
a EMBI: Emerging Markets Bond Index.
4 The cut-off date for table 3 is August 2007. It therefore excludes 
developments subsequent to the Federal Reserve interest rate cuts of 
mid-September, which triggered a new upsurge whose duration and 
intensity were not yet clear at the time this essay was completed.
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and, to some extent, of Chile in the most recent one; 
this correlation does not affect the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, which has had a fixed exchange rate since 
2005 (table 4).
Among the region’s largest countries, the one most 
affected in country risk terms during the first phase of 
upheaval was Colombia, followed by Argentina. However, 
exchange-rate volatility had the greatest effects in Brazil 
and Colombia.5 All stock exchanges saw price falls. The 
combined effect of lower share prices and a depreciating 
peso was very marked in Colombia, whose stock market 
fell by 30% if share prices are measured in dollars 
(table 3). With hindsight, we now know that the appe-
tite for risk in international markets remained strong, 
turning this financial collapse into a mere ripple in the 
upward trend of stock markets (figure 4, section B). Risk 
spreads were back to normal by the end of the year and 
the downward trend in spreads became perceptible again 
in the first half of 2007, except in the cases of Argentina 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. There began 
to be a perception that these two countries were affected 
by a type of risk that may perhaps be most appropriately 
5 In the case of Colombia, the exchange-rate volatility of recent times 
(the highest of any Latin American economy) stands in contrast to 
the first half of the present decade, when volatility was normal by 
international standards. See Banco de la República (2007).
defined, in the terminology of the markets, as “politi-
cal” (Ecuador, which does not appear in the table, had 
experienced something similar in 2006).
The “flight to quality” which characterized the crisis 
of July-August 2007 had a larger impact on high-risk 
securities in the united States market than on emerging 
markets (figure 4, panel A).6 This time, in fact, the 
main mechanism of contagion was the liquidation of 
investors’ positions in emerging markets to cover losses 
or liquidity needs in the markets of the united States 
and other industrialized countries. Among the largest 
Latin American nations, Argentina, Colombia and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela were most affected 
by rising risk spreads, and Brazil and Colombia once 
again by exchange-rate volatility. Chile and Mexico, 
along with Colombia, were the countries where the 
impact on stock markets was greatest (table 3). An 
interesting feature of a crisis that had its epicentre in 
the united States market is that the “flight to quality” 
has been reflected in rising prices for Treasury bonds, 
and interest rates for all terms have tended to fall as a 
result, with the shortest-term rates also being forced 
downward by the decision of the Federal Reserve to cut 
6 See ECLAC (2007b) for an analysis of the effects of this crisis on 
Latin America.
TABLE 4
Latin America (seven largest economies):  
Volatility of risk spreads and exchange rates during two periods of turbulence




Spread volatilityb  
May-July 2006 26.2 19.6 3.6 27.7 14.7 10.1 20.9 16.4
July-September 2007 60.6 21.9 14.5 31.6 15.0 23.5 64.6 25.0
Exchange-rate volatilityc  
May-July 2006 0.56% 3.24% 2.11% 3.12% 1.81% 0.57% 2.24%  
July-September 2007 0.78% 2.95% 0.91% 4.51% 1.21% 0.57%   
Correlation between exchange rate and EMBI+
May-July 2006 0.789 0.832 0.796 0.885 0.755 –0.388 0.477  
July-September 2007 0.818 0.658 0.364 0.789 0.930 0.059   
Source: Estimated on the basis of information from JP Morgan Chase.
a  EMBI+: index of high-risk emerging-market bonds.
b  Standard deviation, expressed in basis points.
c  Coefficient of variation (standard deviation expressed as % of the mean).
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the discount rate on 17 August and the federal funds rate 
on 18 September. Indeed, these cuts in reference rates 
were greater than the rise in the risk spreads of several 
Latin American countries, so that their par interest rates 
actually fell slightly during the crisis.
Although the debate about the implications of the 
recent financial market shock on economic growth in 
the united States and the world continues, the crisis had 
what may be a lasting effect on the behaviour of financial 
agents. Some developments in the united States over 
the last few months are very familiar to Latin American 
countries and the developing world from their own crises. 
Some examples are: the widening contagion of a problem 
that arose in one segment which everyone believed to 
suffer from problems specific to that segment rather 
than being more widely spread, the illiquidity of high-
risk securities and debts, the lack of information about 
portfolio quality, and the “flight to quality” by all agents, 
including the main financial intermediaries. In any event, 
the market euphoria that followed the 18 September cut 
in the discount and federal funds rates was also reflected 
by the surge in Latin American stock markets, making 
the stock market turmoil of July and August look even 
more insignificant than that of the second quarter of 2006 
(figure 4, panel B). The appreciating tendency of Latin 
American currencies had begun before 18 September 
and temporarily accelerated after that date.
One controversial issue has been the effect of fluc-
tuations in international financial markets on the exchange 
rates of the Latin American countries. Machinea and Kacef 
(2007) prepared an analysis according to which changes 
in the real exchange rates of the Latin American countries 
(calculated as the ratio between real exchange rates in 
2005 and the average for the 1990s) reflect the pressures 
from improvements in the terms of trade and the rise in 
remittances from Latin American workers abroad, rather than 
phenomena associated with the capital account. However, 
this analysis, valid if the 1990s are taken as the point of 
comparison, does not explain the dynamics of exchange 
rates during the recent boom or the strong upward pressure 
in real terms on the currencies of Brazil and Colombia, 
the two countries in Latin America where this tendency 
has been most striking in the last three years and where 
exchange-rate volatility has been greatest during periods 
of turmoil in the international financial markets.
As figure 5 shows, there is no systematic relationship 
between improving terms of trade and movements in 
real exchange rates since 2004, a period that coincides 
with the commodity price boom. The chart bears this 
out. Among the larger countries, the great improvement 
in the terms of trade may have been responsible for the 
real appreciation of the Chilean peso at an early stage, 
or of the Venezuelan bolívar more recently (although 
this currency does not show any real appreciation during 
the 2003-2006 period as a whole). But improved terms 
of trade certainly do not account for the large apprecia-
tion that the Brazilian and Colombian currencies have 
experienced in real terms.
As figure 6 confirms, the dynamics of exchange rates 
in these last two countries is unequivocally associated 
with fluctuations in private-sector financial flows. Both 
countries had experienced a large devaluation in the third 
quarter of 2002, coinciding with rising emerging-market 
risk spreads (figure 4, panel A). In the case of Brazil 
this was also associated with market speculation during 
that year’s presidential elections. The exchange rate in 
Brazil strengthened and stabilized in the first half of 2003 
while in Colombia it appreciated more gradually, but 
by mid-2004 neither of the two countries had returned 
to the levels of the first half of 2002.
Strong currency appreciation in Brazil and Colombia 
over recent years has exactly coincided with the two 
phases of exuberance in international financial markets, 
the first of which can be situated, on the basis of the pre-
ceding analysis, between mid-2004 and April 2006, and 
the second between mid-2006 and mid-2007. Currency 
appreciation in both countries during these periods was 
clearly associated with capital flows, as is shown by the 
behaviour of net portfolio flows in the case of Brazil and 
net private-sector capital inflows in Colombia’s foreign 
exchange balance (i.e., flows involving movements of liquid 
resources). In the case of Brazil, net portfolio flows had 
averaged US$ 44 million a month in the four years prior 
to the first of these booms (i.e., between July 2000 and 
June 2004), rising to US$ 309 million a month between 
July 2004 and April 2006. In the case of Colombia, net 
inflows in the private-sector foreign exchange balance 
averaged US$ 232 million a month during this first phase 
of exuberance, having been slightly negative between July 
2000 and June 2004. In both cases, the combination of 
larger inflows of short-term capital and lower risk spreads 
resulted in a large appreciation of the local currency. The 
central banks of both countries began intervening in the 
currency markets during this period but, as we shall see 
later, only to a modest extent.
The episode of April-May 2006 led to an outflow of 
capital from Colombia that had a considerable impact on 
net capital flows, exchange rates and, as we have seen, 
the stock market. The outflow of short-term capital was 
also large in Brazil, but the effects were smaller. Capital 
began to flow in again in the second half of 2006, and 
the flow became an avalanche in the first half of 2007, 
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FIGuRE 5
Latin America (16 countries): Relationship between improved terms of trade  
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ECLAC (2007).
when net private-sector capital inflows through the capital 
accounts reached US$ 4,011 million a month in Brazil 
and US$ 751 million in Colombia, i.e., multiples of the 
amounts entering in the first period of market exuberance. 
Indeed, as figure 6 shows, the size of the capital inflow 
has been so much greater than the amounts normally 
received by these countries that it can only be explained 
by speculation based on the belief that their central banks 
will have to let their currencies appreciate. Continuing 
high interest rates in Brazil and the clear expectation 
that overheating in the economy would force Colombia’s 
Banco de la República to raise rates, as indeed it had 
been doing since the second half of 2006, explains why 
this seemed like a “sure bet” to speculators. This is on 
top of the relative fiscal weakness of the two countries 
and the fact that, as we have seen, both have experienced 
a large reduction in country risk spreads.
The central banks of Brazil and Colombia intervened 
massively during the second episode of financial market 
exuberance, increasing their international reserves by just 
over US$ 61 billion and US$ 6.1 billion, respectively, in 
the first half of 2007. This intervention did not prevent 
both countries’ currencies from appreciating further, 
however. In May, Colombia also reintroduced a legal 
reserve requirement of 40% for incoming financial capital, 
a mechanism that had been successfully employed during 
the boom in capital flows of the 1990s. The introduction 
of the reserve requirement resulted in a fall in net capital 
inflows in June (i.e., before the United States financial crisis 
became apparent), indicating that it had some effect.
The recent shock in international financial markets 
led to a fresh reversal of these tendencies, and the effects 
were felt much more strongly once again in Colombia. 
Indeed, while the Colombian peso shed a great deal of 
the strength it had gained in the first half of 2007, the 
same did not happen with the Brazilian real. It was these 
two countries, furthermore, that saw their currencies 
appreciate most from mid-September onward as a result 
of the new market euphoria generated by the decisions 
of the Federal Reserve.
The rise in private capital flows during the two 
periods of exuberance in international financial markets 
was a more general phenomenon, however, as the capital 
accounts of the main Latin American countries indicate. 
Figure 7 compares aggregate current account balances 
with capital account balances for six of the region’s 
seven largest economies (the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela is excluded for the reasons set out in section 
II of this paper). Capital account balances, which were 
virtually nil between mid-2002 and mid-2004, recovered 
and began to outstrip those of the current account as a 
source of surpluses in the balance of payments. After 
the shock which hit the markets in the second quarter 
of 2006, capital inflows swelled enormously during the 
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FIGuRE 6
Brazil and Colombia: Exchange rates, portfolio flows and capital flows
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Private capital flows (3-month average) Exchange rate
June 2004
Source: Central Bank of Brazil and Banco de la República, de Colombia.
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second period of exuberance. The figures are telling: in 
the six countries considered, the balance-of-payments 
surplus during the last quarter of 2006 and the first half of 
2007 was some uS$ 113 billion dollars, of which about 
uS$ 100 billion came from the capital account (roughly 
two thirds went to Brazil and the remainder to the other 
five economies). As we shall see in the following section, 
the currency authorities reacted correctly to this recent 
avalanche of capital, building up international reserves 
on a scale unprecedented in the region’s history.
There can be no doubt, then, that while other phe-
nomena have been influencing the currency markets, 
speculative capital flows have been a factor and indeed 
have played a crucial role in the two countries that 
seemed the surest bet to speculators. One consequence 
of this is that the large international reserves currently 
held by Latin America are offset by a large amount of 
potentially reversible capital, particularly in the cases 
of Brazil and Colombia. The high degree of correlation 
between exchange rates and risk spreads during the two 
market shocks that have followed the two phases of 
euphoria also bear out this interpretation.
FIGuRE 7






































































































Current account Capital (3-quarter average)Capital account
Source: Author’s estimates based on data from IMF, International Financial Statistics, updated with information from the countries’ central 
banks. In the case of Chile, funds accumulated in the stabilization funds are deemed equivalent to reserves.
a Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
economies in three different ways. First, liberalization 
of the capital account has reduced the scope for inde-
pendent management of monetary and exchange-rate 
policy; efforts to prevent appreciation during upturns 
result in a loss of freedom to adopt countercyclical 
monetary policies, while non-intervention in the cu-
rrency market can mean a high degree of exchange-rate 
volatility. Second, the combination of capital market 
IV
Changes in macroeconomic policy
The history of the last few decades in Latin America has 
been marked by procyclical macroeconomic policies 
that have boosted economic growth during periods 
of external buoyancy but built up vulnerabilities that 
make themselves felt when these exceptional external 
conditions come to an end.
The economic reforms of the last few years have 
affected the cyclical behaviour of the Latin American 
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liberalization and domestic financial liberalization has 
reinforced the operation of the financial accelerator, 
which tends to increase lending, asset inflation and 
private expenditure during upturns only for the opposite 
to occur in downturns. Third, the increased income-
elasticity of short-term import demand has made the 
current account more sensitive to the business cycle: 
the conjunction of higher demand growth and real 
currency appreciation results in a rapid deterioration 
of the current account during upturns, but this is also 
corrected more quickly during crises. Of these three 
mechanisms, only the last could be considered to have 
some countercyclical effects, insofar as the domestic 
effects of the procyclical behaviour of private spending 
are thereby smoothed. But the price for this is that it 
also contributes to these economies’ external vulne-
rability during upturns.
An interesting corollary of the cyclical behaviour 
of economies subject to procyclical inflows of external 
financing is that the “twin deficit” of current account 
variations is the private-sector balance, not the public-
sector one. This can be clearly seen in figure 8: the large 
current account adjustment experienced by the Latin 
American economy between 1998 and 2003 resulted 
from an improvement in the private-sector balance; the 
deterioration in the current account over the last three 
years, when adjusted for the terms of trade, is the result 
of a deterioration in that same balance. This also seems 
to be a general characteristic of “successful” countries 
during upturns, as Marfán (2005) points out.
In this context, and in very open economies ge-
nerally, it can be said that the only really autonomous 
policy instrument available to the economic authorities 
is fiscal policy. According to economic theory, this is 
also the most powerful instrument for affecting eco-
nomic activity in economies whose capital markets 
have been liberalized. However, fiscal policy has also 
been subject to procyclical behaviour, for two diffe-
rent reasons. The first is the direct effect generated by 
the availability of resources, whether tax revenues or 
financing: the abundance of resources during upturns 
tends to increase public spending, while lower revenues, 
combined with the higher cost of debt servicing, lead 
to cuts in primary spending during crises. The second 
concerns political pressures on economic policyma-
king: after a period of public spending cutbacks, it 
is hard to convince the population of the virtues of a 
continuing programme of austerity. This is even truer 
if the justification for the austerity programme during 
the upturn is the need to offset the exuberance of private 
spending (Marfán, 2005).
Analysis of the most recent Latin American cycle 
confirms the procyclical behaviour of private and public 
expenditure and of the monetary and credit variables, 
with some interesting variants. In economies with net 
foreign-currency liabilities, the tendency towards currency 
appreciation during upturns generates positive wealth effects 
which help to boost private demand.7 As already noted, 
the most important countercyclical element is the large 
rise in imports resulting from high income-elasticity and 
real currency appreciation, which shift a large portion of 
demand abroad. Thus, the effects of real appreciation on 
the current account are countercyclical, unlike wealth 
effects. The behaviour of imports does, however, pro-
duce a rapid deterioration in the balance-of-payments 
current account, helping to create the conditions for the 
next downturn. The main “twin deficit” of the current 
account is the private deficit, as we have seen, but in 
the Latin American countries it has been common for 
public-sector deficits to increase at the same time.
Once the downturn has started, the most important 
development is the collapse of private spending, although 
the effects of this on aggregate demand are smoothed 
by the even faster decline in imports. During this phase, 
currency depreciation once again has a procyclical wealth 
effect (the loss of wealth associated with net liabilities 
denominated in foreign currencies) that contributes to the 
contraction of demand. It also sets up a countercyclical 
effect that operates through the balance-of-payments 
current account but takes time to make itself felt fully in 
the economy, partly because of the financial shocks that 
characterize the initial phase of the downturn. Monetary 
and credit policy also has procyclical effects to begin 
with, either because the authorities try to smooth the 
inflationary effects of depreciation by measures such 
as higher interest rates or credit restraint, or both, or 
simply because private-sector credit collapses while 
higher country risk spreads place pressure on domestic 
interest rates.
7   Note that when net financial balances turn positive, as they have 
now done in three of the region’s seven largest economies, this wealth 
effect becomes countercyclical in relation to the economy as a whole. 
To ascertain whether the argument remains valid, however, it would be 
necessary to calculate the net financial balance of the private sector. 
In most cases, it is the public sector that has built up a positive net 
financial balance (this is even true of Brazil, whose net financial 
balance is still negative).
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The most important countercyclical factor operating 
initially in several Latin American economies has been 
public spending, which tends to hold up or even increase 
when a crisis breaks. As the fiscal accounts deteriorate, 
however, financing constraints are brought in, leading 
to measures to correct the deficit, either by increasing 
revenue or by reducing expenditure. Meanwhile, currency 
depreciation begins to have ever stronger countercyclical 
effects on the balance-of-payments current account, 
while the large depreciation that has built up in real terms 
allows the authorities concerned to loosen monetary 
policy. The countercyclical role played by these two 
factors is vital during the recovery phase and relieves 
fiscal policy of this task to some degree.
Generally speaking (although there are variatio-
ns from one country to another), the Latin American 
countries were in the initial adjustment phase during 
the 1998-2001 period, passing to the second phase in 
2002-2003. The first phase was characterized by a rapid 
correction of private-sector deficits and, in some cases, 
a deterioration in the fiscal accounts; in the second, on 
the other hand, the public accounts tended to do better 
while those of the private sector improved yet further. 
In practice, the private-sector deficit for the region as a 
whole (estimated rather crudely by deducting the central 
government balance from the current account balance) 
was corrected in 1999, even as the public-sector deficit 
continued to worsen (as shown by the gap between the 
two lines in figure 8); then in 2002 the budget deficit 
began to shrink (very slowly), while the private-sector 
surplus increased yet further.
In this context, what new developments have 
there been in Latin America during the recent upturn? 
As figure 8 shows, in the region as a whole the upturn 
has served to correct the budget deficit left over from 
the downturn. The private-sector accounts, on the other 
hand, have followed the pattern typical of previous up-
turns by starting to deteriorate, although they are still in 
surplus. Naturally, the calculations would alter if in each 
case we were to discount the gain of a little over three 
percentage points of GDP in the terms of trade; in the 
private sector, particularly, this would mean discounting 
the effect of the upturn on foreign firms operating in 
the hydrocarbon and mining sectors, where prices have 
risen most sharply.
The first great difference from the past seems to lie, 
then, in fiscal management. However, the story is rather 
less favourable than the aggregate figures suggest. Table 
5 shows what has happened with primary spending by the 
central government in the seven largest Latin American 
countries. Strictly countercyclical fiscal management 
during upturns requires not only that extraordinary 
FIGuRE 8
Latin America: “Twin” surpluses and deficits
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from ECLAC (2007).
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fiscal revenue be saved, but also that primary spending 
be reduced as a proportion of GDP, as this expenditure 
should follow the long-term trend of GDP growth. On 
this definition, only Chile and Peru have followed coun-
tercyclical fiscal policies, underpinned in Chile by the 
redesign of the country’s stabilization funds (Economic 
and Social Stabilization Fund and Pension Reserve 
Fund, since 2006) and in Peru by legally binding limits 
on primary spending increases; in this latter case, the 
rules concerned, which were changed in 2006, imply 
that public-sector investment in Peru will not be subject 
to these constraints in future, so that the countercyclical 
effect will wear off. The other countries in table 5 have 
operated procyclical fiscal policies, most strikingly in 
the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In the 
cases of Brazil and Mexico, it could perhaps be argued 
that the continuing weakness of economic growth makes 
a more expansionary fiscal policy advisable, while higher 
spending in Brazil might be justified by the fact that the 
country is running a large primary surplus. The first of 
these arguments has some merit. The second is clearly 
wrong: fiscal policy is procyclical in this case even if 
the public accounts yield a primary surplus.
The generally procyclical fiscal policy that continued 
to be applied in some countries during the recent upturn 
is at odds, of course, with the complex institutional 
apparatus created in the late 1990s, when numerous 
fiscal responsibility laws were passed and stabilization 
funds established. Rule changes and the earmarking of 
resources indicate that these institutions have had only 
a limited impact so far (Jiménez and Tromben, 2006).
Again, the combined effect of the current upturn and 
higher prices for hydrocarbons and mining products has 
had as its corollary that countries with an export base of 
this type are generally the ones to have benefited most in 
terms of public revenue (Jiménez and Tromben, 2006). 
This is what has happened, most particularly, in Chile 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (and Bolivia 
among the smaller countries)8 and, to a lesser extent, 
in Colombia and Peru. The effect has been strengthe-
ned by a rising tax burden on these sectors, especially 
in Bolivia, Ecuador and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela in the case of hydrocarbons and Chile in the 
case of copper (special tax on the operating revenues 
of mining companies). In the case of Argentina, it must 
be recalled that the country strengthened its tax base 
8  This is not the case with Ecuador, since the country is using much 
of its additional oil surplus to subsidize domestic fuel consumption.
at the beginning of the upturn by appropriating some 
of the benefits accruing to certain commodities from 
real exchange rate depreciation by means of so-called 
“retentions” on exports; in 2007 it did much the same 
thing, only this time by appropriating part of the increase 
in international commodity prices.
The second major new development is the frequency 
and scale of official intervention in the currency markets, 
reflected in the build-up of external assets by central 
banks and, in the case of Chile, by the government in 
fiscal stabilization funds. This means that the leading 
Latin American economies (with the exception of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela since 2005) generally 
operate a “dirty” float (with variants, as will be seen later). 
Thus, the countries have usually opted for “intermediate” 
managed exchange-rate regimes, running counter to the 
orthodox recommendation of adopting one of the two 
extremes: either a free float or a fixed parity (1990s 
Argentine-style convertibility or dollarization). What 
this suggests is that there is an implicit exchange-rate 
target. The benefits of exchange-rate targets have been 
analysed theoretically9 and their use can be justified 
in the light of Latin American economic history. The 
only explicit policy of this type is the one adopted by 
Argentina, where the maintenance of a competitive 
exchange rate is one of the cornerstones of macroeco-
nomic policy. Indeed, the Argentine experience shows 
that, in situations where external financing is abundant, 
it is possible to exercise control over the exchange rate 
and interest rates simultaneously even with a liberalized 
capital account, which runs completely counter to the 
famous open economy “trilemma” (Frenkel, 2007).
As is very well known, a policy of this type requires 
that the build-up of international reserves during uptur-
ns be matched by measures to sterilize their monetary 
impact. Sterilization of this type is easier when there 
is a fiscal surplus. Otherwise (and as an additional 
measure in any event) it will be necessary to sterilize 
via a mix of traditional open market operations, sales 
of central bank-issued bonds in the market, or higher 
reserve requirements.
For this reason, in the Argentine model the fiscal 
surplus is an essential complement to the policy of 
maintaining a highly competitive exchange rate; the 
possible erosion of this surplus, if public spending 
continues its recent rate of increase, is a threat to the 
macroeconomic policy model adopted by Argentina. 
9  See Williamson (2000), for example.
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TABLE 5
Latin America (seven largest economies): Monetary, credit and fiscal policy indicators
(Percentages) 
 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Venezuela 
(B.R.)
A. Change in central government fiscal accounts as % of GDP, 2003-2006
Current revenuesa 1.2 2.4 5.2 2.2 0.6 2.5 6.7
Primary spending 0.7 2.1 –2.5 1.4 1.3 –0.5 4.9
Primary balance 0.6 –0.2 7.7 1.0 –0.7 3.0 1.8
B. Central government fiscal balance, 2006
Primary balance 2.7 2.1 8.4 –0.3 0.1 3.2 2.1
Total balance 1.0 –3.1 7.7 –4.4 –2.0 1.4 0.0
C. Change in nominal interest rate, 2003-2006
Policyb –4.8 4.0 2.5 0.8 2.5  
Interbank 3.5 –8.1 2.3 –0.5 0.7 2.0 –8.0
D. Real interest rate (deposits) 
2003 –2.9 6.3 –0.1 0.6 –1.4 0.8 –10.6
2004 –1.7 8.3 0.9 1.8 –1.9 –1.2 –7.5
2005 –5.4 10.1 0.9 1.9 –0.5 1.0 –3.7
2006 –4.0 9.4 1.7 1.9 –0.3 1.2 –3.0
E. Change in balances as % of GDP, 2003-2006
Monetary base –0.1 0.9 0.3 1.2 0.5 1.0 3.4
M1 1.9 1.1 0.6 1.7 0.9 1.8  
M3 2.6 10.0 –7.8 5.0 5.8 1.1 8.7
Lending to the private sector 2.3 7.3 1.6 10.7 3.7 –3.0 3.9
Source: ECLAC for fiscal statistics, IMF International Financial Statistics for interest rates and monetary and credit variables (except in the case 
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, where they were estimated from ECLAC figures), JP Morgan Chase for basic policy rates.
a Total revenues in the case of Brazil and Mexico.
b Between June 2004 and September 2007. The equivalent rate for the United States rose by 3.75%.
Precisely the opposite situation is found in Brazil and 
Colombia, since these two countries still have the largest 
overall fiscal deficits; this factor has unquestionably 
made them more vulnerable to currency speculation. 
Mexico has opted for a cleaner float. The same could 
be said of Chile, which operates a clean float from the 
exchange-rate policy standpoint, but whose government 
intervenes massively in the currency markets through 
the stabilization funds.
Figure 9 shows the scale of official intervention in the 
currency markets of six countries during the two phases 
of market exuberance discussed earlier, from July 2004 
to April 2006 and from July 2006 to June 2007. In both 
cases, intervention included the accumulation of reserves, 
the use of these reserves to pay off IMF debts and, in the 
case of Chile, the build-up of stabilization funds abroad. 
For the sake of comparability, interventions have been 
calculated as an annual equivalent (the second period did 
actually last a year) and as a proportion of GDP. It can be 
seen that intervention took place on a large scale. This was 
particularly true of Argentina in the first period, followed 
by Peru and Brazil. In the second period, intervention 
was massive in Argentina, Brazil and Chile and very high 
in Colombia and Peru. In all cases, it far exceeded the 
current account surplus (Colombia is the only country of 
the five to run a current account deficit), indicating that 
it also absorbed surpluses from private-sector capital 
flows. Of the region’s seven largest countries, Mexico is 
the only one where official intervention in the currency 
market has been limited.
Monetary and credit policies are very difficult 
to compare. Although national situations vary, all the 
countries had slightly or markedly procyclical mone-
tary and credit policies during the recent upturn. This 
is reflected in basic intervention rates, which have 
risen by less than united States Federal Reserve rates 
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(except in Chile, where it is slightly higher), and can 
be seen even more clearly in interbank rates (table 5). 
With the striking exception of Brazil (where real interest 
rates are still extremely high despite a large reduction 
in nominal rates), deposit rates have remained at very 
low levels in real terms (they were negative in three 
of the seven countries in 2006). In addition, with few 
exceptions, monetary and credit aggregates have risen 
as a proportion of GDP. The table shows two worrying 
cases of very rapid growth in financial system lending to 
the private sector: these are Brazil and Colombia, and it 
is no coincidence that they are the two countries where 
capital inflows have increased most dramatically. The 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela also displays clearly 
expansionary monetary and credit indicators.
One favourable trend on the monetary and credit 
front has been the “de-dollarization” of different countries 
in recent years. The most widespread development has 
been the tendency for foreign currency-denominated 
public-sector liabilities issued in local capital markets 
to dwindle or disappear. Argentina conducted a radical 
de-dollarization of its financial system during the crisis 
of the early part of the decade, and Peru has adopted a 
policy of gradual de-dollarization (together with Bolivia 
and uruguay, among smaller countries).
Taking everything together, one of the most 
interesting conclusions from the analysis is that the 
macroeconomic policy challenges facing the region’s 
main economies are highly diverse (although we are 
concentrating on the macroeconomic challenges, we 
are obviously aware that there are other major economic 
challenges, not least the need to diversify the production 
structure and, in certain countries, energy problems). 
Chile is in the soundest position, thanks to a successful 
countercyclical fiscal policy; this might be said to have 
gone too far in 2006, with the result that growth was 
relatively slow, but the situation has now been remedied. 
Peru is the country that most resembles Chile where 
fiscal policy is concerned. Argentina has also had a 
very successfully macroeconomic policy, grounded in 
a competitive currency and a fiscal surplus; if the recent 
upward trend in public spending is maintained, however, 
the second of these pillars will be eroded. Along with the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, furthermore, Argentina 
is the country with the highest inflation rate.
Exchange-rate competitiveness and the rapid growth 
of domestic credit are the main problems facing Brazil 
and Colombia, and their most obvious result is the dete-
rioration of the current account, which is well advanced 
in Colombia and could materialize soon in Brazil. The 
combination of a more austere fiscal policy, monetary 
FIGuRE 9
Latin America (six countries):  
official intervention in currency markets, two periods













Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
July 2004-April 2006 July 2006-June 2007
Source: Estimates based on changes in reserves as given by IMF International Financial Statistics. In the case of Chile, the later period includes 
resources saved in the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund and Pension Reserve Fund. Nominal dollar GDP is the average for 2004 and 2005 
in the first period and the 2006 figure in the second. Reserves accumulated in the first period are calculated as a 12-month average equivalent.
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and prudential measures to check credit growth and 
greater intervention in the currency markets (including 
the reserve requirement for external financing adopted 
by Colombia in May 2007) may be the right answer. As 
long as these measures are applied, Brazil’s high interest 
rates will continue to be a magnet for outside capital. 
Mexico, meanwhile, can be seen as an intermediate case 
in all the aspects analysed; its main problems concern 
competitiveness. This being so, it would not be illogical 
for this country to join the South American (and Asian) 
V
Conclusions
trend towards more active exchange-rate management 
as part of its economic policy.
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, lastly, has 
the most expansionary fiscal policy, while monetary 
and credit policy is also procyclical. Of the region’s 
largest countries, therefore, it is the only one still en-
gaging in patterns of macroeconomic behaviour that 
were widespread in Latin America in the past and that 
will be sustainable only if conditions in the oil market 
remain exceptional.
markets, it is worth adopting preventive measures to 
check the inflow of capital. Chile and Colombia used 
these successfully in the 1990s. Colombia also adopted 
measures of this type during the recent boom, although 
only once the influx of capital and the appreciation of 
the currency had reached a very advanced stage.
Lastly, the two major (and complementary) ma-
croeconomic policy developments that have occurred 
in Latin America in recent years need to be consoli-
dated and applied more widely: countercyclical fiscal 
management, pioneered by Chile and to a lesser extent 
by Peru, and active currency market intervention, with 
the build-up of international reserves that this entails. 
The leading example of this latter policy is Argentina, 
where events have also underscored the complementary 
relationship between exchange-rate competitiveness and 
the maintenance of a fiscal surplus (although this risks 
being eroded because of the expansionary fiscal policy 
followed recently).
Where there is active intervention in currency 
markets, it may be worth acknowledging that the real 
exchange rate is a legitimate goal of macroeconomic 
policy, something that tends to be implicit rather than 
explicit in all countries but Argentina. The absence of 
an effective curb on currency appreciation can become 
a magnet for capital inflows in periods when private-
sector agents are expecting this to occur. Brazil and 
Colombia have been obvious victims of the influx of 
speculative capital seeking to take advantage of these 
exchange-rate trends. There is an obvious risk in all 
the countries, but especially these two, that the flows 
may be reversed.
For this reason, it would not be illogical to move 
towards an asymmetrical currency regime designed to 
The analysis carried out here points to three conclu-
sions. The first is that the region has already reaped 
considerable benefits by using the current commodity 
price boom as an opportunity to reduce external liabi-
lities and build up international reserves. The build-up 
of reserves looks less impressive, however, when set 
against the concomitant increase in portfolio liabilities, 
whose essential characteristic during the recent upturn 
has been the increased quantity of resources invested by 
international investment funds in local stock and bond 
markets. At the same time, the current account, adjusted 
for the terms of trade, is deteriorating, and this will ul-
timately remove the most striking feature of the recent 
situation: the conjunction of a current account surplus 
with rapid economic growth. This combination, then, 
has its origin in an exceptional surge in hydrocarbon and 
mining product prices (more than agricultural prices) 
and does not reflect, as in East Asia, a high degree of 
international competitiveness.
The second conclusion is that we should remain 
aware of the potential of the international financial 
markets to deliver shocks like those occurring in a 
variety of forms over the past few years. The largest 
one was the massive influx of capital into the region’s 
larger countries during the two periods of exuberance 
in international financial markets (between mid-2004 
and April 2006, and between mid-2006 and mid-2007), 
particularly the second. In the two countries most sensitive 
to this phenomenon, Brazil and Colombia, the massive 
inflow of capital was reflected in the rapid growth of 
financial system lending to the private sector and ex-
cessive appreciation of the local currencies, the risks of 
which are now beginning to become clear. Insofar as the 
source of the disruption is the exuberance of financial 
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compensate for the asymmetry affecting developing 
countries in the international capital markets, i.e., easy 
access in upturns and inadequate access in downturns. This 
regime would establish an exchange-rate ceiling (which 
could take the form of a crawling peg during upturns), 
but would allow currencies to float during downturns. 
The international reserves accumulated during upturns 
would be used to intervene in currency markets during 
downturns to achieve an orderly exchange-rate adjustment 
and such other goals as the authorities may set themsel-
ves, particularly in relation to interest rates. The reserves 
build-up during upturns obviously needs to be properly 
sterilized, something that is easier to do if there is a fiscal 
surplus, i.e., a countercyclical fiscal policy.
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